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STATE REGULATION OF AIRLINES AND THE
AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
JOHN W. FREEMAN*
S TATE REGULATION of airlines played an interesting role in
the political decision to loosen federal controls on the aviation
industry. Throughout the long, heated debate over deregulation,
airlines operating under state jurisdiction were cited frequently as
evidence that federal regulation had produced excessive fares and
prevented innovative, low-cost services.! So it might seem ironic,
at first glance, that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978 (ADA)
includes a provision which will have the practical effect of stripping
the states of most of their economic regulatory authority over
airlines.2
* J.D., University of Pennsylvania, 1972; Senior Attorney in the Office of the
General Counsel at the Civil Aeronautics Board.
' See, e.g., S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 102-04 (1978); Regulatory
Reform in Air Transportation: Hearings on S. 2551, S. 3364, and S. 3536 Before
the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 94th Cong., 2d
Sess. 231, 258-64 (1976); I SIMAT, HELLIESEN, AND EICHNER, INC., AN ANALYSIS
OF THE INTRASTATE AIR CARRIER REGULATORY FORUM, SUMMARY REPORT (1976);
Oversight of Civil Aeronautics Board Practices and Procedures: Hearings before
the Subcomm. on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 452-59, 462-87 (1975); Regulatory Reform in
Air Transportation: Hearings on S. 292 and S. 689 Before the Subcomm. on Avia-
tion of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 99-100, 280-81,
290-91, 310-11, 366-70, 374-86 (1977); CAB EDR-353 (April 13, 1978), at App.
B, 43 Fed. Reg. 16,512 (1978).
2 Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504 § 4(a), 92 Stat. 1707
(1978) (adding § 105 to the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. S 1305).
The ADA generally forbids state regulation of routes, rates, or services of carriers
having federal authority under Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act. While there
is a theoretical area of jurisdiction left to states-airlines without federal author-
ity-as a practical matter few airlines will remain under state jurisdiction. All
airlines operating aircraft with more than 56 seats now have federal certificates
under Title IV, including those airlines previously regulated by the states. For
example, Pacific Southwest Airlines (PSA), Air California, Southwest Airlines,
and Air Florida, all now have federal certificates. CAB Order No. 78-11-41 (No-
vember 9, 1978) and CAB Order No. 78-12-70 (December 12, 1978). Airlines
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Upon closer inspection, any apparent inconsistency in the con-
gressional approach to state regulatory authority disappears. When
the experience of intrastate airlines was cited, it was intended to
show how the industry would react once freed from the public
utility type of regulation imposed under the existing federal stat-
utes.' The experiences cited generally predated the introduction of
comprehensive state regulatory schemes." Moreover, since the thesis
of deregulation is that the rigors of the marketplace will produce a
more efficient industry than government regulation,' it was logical
for Congress to include as part of the ADA limitations restrictions
on the states' power to engage in economic regulation. It is import-
ant to keep this congressional policy in mind in analyzing issues
that arise under the preemption provisions of the ADA.
I. PREEMPTION UNDER PRE-ADA FEDERAL AND
STATE REGULATORY SCHEMES
Prior to the ADA, there was no explicit statutory preemption
of state regulation of airlines. There was, however, a significant
body of case law on the subject of preemption generally, and on
its application to airline regulation. The Supreme Court has ana-
lyzed a variety of state exercises of police power in the area of
interstate commerce, most recently in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co.! Under the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, federal law
is supreme and binding on the states, notwithstanding contrary pro-
visions of state law.' While the Court acknowledges that historic
police powers of the states are not to be superseded by federal law
with less than 56 seats are guaranteed federal authority through the statutory
commuter exemptions and the Board's air taxi regulation if they comply with a
few relatively non-burdensome requirements. See note 83 infra.
I See note 1 supra.
4Id.
'See generally S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5; H.R. REP. No. 1211,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1-5 (1978).
6435 U.S. 151 (1978).
U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 2,
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be
made in pursuance thereof and all Treaties made, or which shall be
made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the su-
preme law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws of the State to the
contrary notwithstanding.
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absent clear congressional intent, the congressional purpose may
be evidenced in several ways.' Short of an explicit statement of
preemption, the scheme of federal regulation may be so pervasive
as to make reasonable the inference that Congress left no room for
the states to supplement it.' Or the Act of Congress may touch a
field in which the federal interest is so dominant that the federal
system will be assumed to preclude enforcement of state laws on
the same subject." Likewise, the goal sought to be obtained by the
federal law and the character of the obligations imposed by it may
reveal a similar need for exclusive federal control.1
The above standards are used to determine whether Congress
has completely foreclosed state legislation in a particular area.
Even if this is not the case, a state statute is void to the extent that
it actually conflicts with a valid federal statute." A conflict will be
found where compliance with both federal and state law is physi-
cally impossible, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to
the accomplishment of the full purposes and objectives of Con-
gress."
Federal involvement in economic regulation of air transporta-
tion began in 1926, when Congress passed legislation to promote
aviation through mail subsidies.' Indeed, most of the early federal
programs which sought to foster commercial aviation utilized pro-
tective and lucrative systems of air mail subsidies." Strict public-
utility type regulation began with the Civil Aeronautics Act of
1938.' By 1958, Congress had recodified the economic regulation
8 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978); Jones v. Rath Packing
Co., 430 U.S. 519, 525 (1977); Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218,
230 (1947).
9 Cloverleaf Butter Co. v. Patterson, 315 U.S. 148 (1941); Pennsylvania R.R.
Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 250 U.S. 566, 569 (1918).
10 Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941).
" Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973); Napier v.
Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S. 605 (1926); New York Central R. Co. v. Win-
field, 244 U.S. 147 (1916); Charleston W.C.R. Co. v. Varnville Co., 237 U.S. 59
(1914); and Southern R. Co. v. Railroad Comm'n, 236 U.S. 439 (1914).
12Jones v. Rath Packing Co., 430 U.S. 519, 540-41 (1977); De Canas v.
Bica, 424 U.S. 351 (1976); and Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul,
373 U.S. 132, 142-43 (1963); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 67 (1940).
13 Id.
4 Air Commerce Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-254, 44 Stat. 568 (1926).
"See S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1978).
"Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973 (1938), now codified in Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 72 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1542 (1976).
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of commercial aviation in the Federal Aviation Act of 1958"'
(Act), complete with a system of federal licensing, rate regula-
tion, subsidy and regulation of mergers, acquisitions and inter-
carrier agreements. Under the Act, federal economic regulatory re-
sponsibility was vested in the Civil Aeronautics Board (CAB)."
Meanwhile, a number of states were developing their own forms
of economic regulation of aviation, a few of which included exten-
sive licensing and rate regulation.' For example, California,
through its Public Utilities Commission (CPUC), regulated intra-
state rates of all carriers and imposed licensing requirements on
carriers not holding certificates from the CAB." A questionnaire
circulated in 1976 by the National Association of State Aviation
Officials to its members revealed the following statistics: twenty-
five states required certificates or permits of service; fifteen states
regulated flight schedules; seventeen regulated quality of service;
nineteen regulated discontinuance of service; and nineteen regu-
lated rates.' In addition, many states attempted to control airline
mergers, liability insurance, and accounting."
Obviously, there was a great potential for conflict between the
federal and state governments. In analyzing such conflicts, it is
important to recognize that Congress defined federal economic
regulatory authority in terms of "interstate, overseas and foreign
air transportation."" For illustrative purposes, the statutory defi-
nition of interstate air transportation can be generally summarized
as common carriage by aircraft between a point in one state and
a point in any other state.' This definition is applicable whether
1172 Stat. 731, as amended, 49 U.S.C. § 1301-1542 (1976), formerly Civil
Aeronautics Act of 1938, Ch. 601, 52 Stat. 973.
18Id.
"'CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 2739-2769.5 (West 1975).
See id.
'1 Memorandum to members from the National Association of State Aviation
Officials, 1000 Vermont Avenue, N.W., Washington, D.C., 20005 (September 22,
1976) (summarizing results of questionnaire to members).
2 Id.
'See, e.g., 49 U.S.C. § 1373-1374, 1482 (1976).
2449 U.S.C. § 1301(22) (1976) defines the term as follows:
"Interstate air commerce" . . . mean[s] the carriage by aircraft
of persons or property for compensation or hire, or the carriage
of mail by aircraft, ... in commerce between ...
(a) a place in any State of the United States, or the District of
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such commerce moves wholly by aircraft, or partly by aircraft and
partly by other forms of transportation.' In defining interstate air
transportation, the origin and destination of the traffic, not a par-
ticular flight leg, determines the nature of the flight. For example,
a passenger traveling from New York to Sacramento, who flies
on one airline to Los Angeles and connects there with a second air-
line, is in interstate air transportation even with respect to the
"intrastate" leg of his journey.2 Therefore an airline operating
within one state can engage in interstate air transportation by carry-
ing traffic that is on an interstate movement. As every airline may
at some time carry an interstate passenger, the CAB has in the
past tempered this broad definition by asserting jurisdiction only
over carriers with more than a de minimis amount of interstate
traffic."
Under the above definition of interstate air transportation the
states were left to regulate airlines that carried a de minimis
amount of interstate traffic. As noted, several states established
regulations for intrastate airlines. In some cases, states also tried
to regulate intrastate aspects of operations by carriers engaging in
interstate air transportation pursuant to federal authority. 8 A
single flight was thus subject to concurrent state and federal regula-
tion of its operating authority and rates.
In the area of route authority, state regulation was struck down
by the Supreme Courts of Massachusetts and Nebraska, where it
Columbia, and a place in any other State of the United States, or
the District of Columbia; or between places in the same State of
the United States through the airspace over any place outside there-
of; or between places in the same Territory or possession of the
United States, or the District of Columbia;
whether such commerce moves wholly by aircraft or partly by
aircraft and partly by other forms of transportation.
2 Id.
21 California v. CAB, 581 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, -
U.S. -, 99 S. Ct. 834 (1979); CAB v. Friedkin Aeronautics, 246 F.2d 173 (9th
Cir. 1957). See also United States v. Capital Transit Co., 325 U.S. 357 (1945).
27 See Lake Tahoe Service Investigation, CAB Order No. 78-5-77 (May 12,
1978). For cases on the validity of state regulation of purely intrastate carriers,
see City of Dallas v. Southwest Airlines, 494 F.2d 773 (5th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 1079 (1974); Texas Int'l Airlines v. CAB, 473 F.2d 1150 (D.C. Cir.
1972).
28 See note 19 supra.
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involved the movement of planes on interstate schedules, and the
state regulation would seriously frustrate the federal scheme of
regulation." The Massachusetts Supreme Court struck down a
state law forbidding supersonic passenger aircraft landings in that
state." The Nebraska Supreme Court ruled that the state could not
require an airline to serve part of an interstate route that the CAB
had allowed the airline to drop.' Similarly, the Colorado Public
Utilities Commission reluctantly decided to suspend Frontier's serv-
ice obligation to coincide with similar CAB action."
In the area of rate regulation, on the other hand, the California
Supreme Court upheld the state's authority to regulate the fare
paid by San Francisco-Los Angeles passengers on United and
Western Airlines.' The court found no implicit or explicit federal
preemption of intrastate rate regulation, notwithstanding claims
that federal rate and subsidy policies were affected by it." Later,
however, the District Court for the Northern District of California
struck down the CPUC's minimum rates for services provided by
motor carriers that were exempt from Interstate Commerce Com-
mission (ICC) rate regulation on the grounds that the ICC exemp-
tion preempted the state regulation." The United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit made it clear that
only the CAB could set intrastate rates of federal carriers in Cali-
"Pioneer Airways, Inc. v. City of Kearney, 199 Neb. 12, 256 N.W.2d 324
(1977); Opinion of the Justices, - Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 354 (1971); Frontier
Airlines, Inc. v. Neb. Dep't of Aeronautics, 175 Neb. 501, 122 N.W.2d 476
(1963).
30 Opinion of the Justices, - Mass. _ 271 N.E.2d 354 (1971).
a Pioneer Airways, Inc. v. City of Kearney, 199 Neb. 12, 256 N.W.2d 324
(1977); Frontier Airlines, Inc. v. Neb. Dep't of Aeronautics, 175 Neb. 501, 122
N.W.2d 476 (1963).
'3Re Frontier Airlines, 93 P.U.R. 71 (1952). See also Braniff Int'l, Inc. v.
Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir. 1978) (regarding procedures
for attacking Florida's regulation of interstate carriers' routes). In the regulation
of surface transportation there is precedent for the idea that a state may not deny
intrastate authority to a carrier that has authority from the federal government to
carry interstate traffic in a particular market. Railroad Transfer Serv., Inc. v.
Chicago, 386 U.S. 351 (1967); Interstate Busses Corp. v. Holyoke Street Ry. Co.,
273 U.S. 45 (1926).
"People v. Western Airlines, 42 Cal. 2d 621, 268 P.2d 723 (1954).
"268 P.2d at 738.
3Baltimore Ship. & Receiv. Ass'n v. Cal. Pub. Util. Co mm'n, 268 F. Supp.
836 (N.D. Cal. 1967), afl'd, 389 U.S. 583 (1968).
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fornia v. Civil Aeronautics Board.'
In contrast to the scope of federal economic regulation, Congress
established broader control over federal environmental and safety
regulation.' The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) has
broad authority over "air commerce." This term has been defined
to include all operations within the limits of any "federal airway" 8
or which directly affect or may endanger safety in "interstate,
overseas or foreign air commerce."' Federal regulation of aviation
safety and noise therefore leaves no room for state police power
regulation."0
When a state or local government is acting as an airport owner
or proprietor, however, the need to permit the government to im-
pose restrictions on aircraft operations has been recognized by the
courts.' This is due to the requirement that the state compensate
- 581 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, - U.S. _, 99 S. Ct.
834 (1979).
3 See City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
It is fairly clear that Congress could, if it chose to, totally occupy the field by ex-
tending economic regulation to local activities that are related to and have
an effect on interstate commerce. See Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 153
(1926); Minnesota Rate Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 398-99 (1915).
38 The term "federal airway" means a portion of the navigable airspace of
the United States designated as such by the FAA. 49 U.S.C. S 1301(18) (1976).
39 49 U.S.C. § 1301(20) (1976). Interstate air commerce is defined as follows:
(20) "interstate air commerce" . . . means the carriage by air-
craft of persons or property for compensation or hire, or the car-
riage of mail by aircraft, or the operation or navigation of aircraft
in the conduct or furtherance of a business or vocation, in com-
merce between, respectively-
(a) a place in any State of the United States, of the District of
Columbia, and a place in any other State of the United States, or
the District of Columbia; or between places in the same State of
the United States through the airspace over any place outside
thereof; or between places in the same Territory or possession
of the United States, or the District of Columbia;
(c) a place in the United States and any place outside thereof;
whether such commerce moves wholly by aircraft or partly by
aircraft and partly by other forms of transportation.
40 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39
(1973).
41British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of New York, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.),
on remand, 437 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd & modified, 564 F.2d 1002
(2d Cir. 1977); San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283
(S.D. Cal. 1978); National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D.
Cal, 1976); Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth. of New York, 305 F.
Supp. 93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Cook County v. Priester, 22 Ill. App. 3d 964, 318
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adjacent landowners for any constructive taking of their property.'
The Supreme Court specifically recognized these "proprietary
rights" in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc." Under
the proprietary rights doctrine, courts have upheld reasonable, non-
discriminatory restrictions imposed by an airport proprietor acting
on his own, but not under compulsion of the state police power."
The pattern of CAB regulation of airlines prior to the enactment
of the ADA was at times exclusive, occasionally concurrent with
state regulation, and even absent in some cases. Although the CAB
had broad jurisdiction, its de minimis rule left certain intrastate
routes unregulated by the federal government. Certain regulatory
powers were left to the states under the doctrine of "proprietary
rights" and other powers were exercised by the states under ques-
tionable authority. It was against this background that Congress en-
acted Section 105 of the ADA, explicitly preempting state regula-
tion of airline "rates, routes, and services."'
II. THE AIRLINE DEREGULATION ACT OF 1978
The ADA establishes a thorough program of economic deregula-
tion of the airline industry, following a transition period culminat-
ing in the dissolution of the CAB." In the transition period, entry
into the industry is greatly liberalized, the CAB's authority to
regulate rates is significantly reduced, and the standards used in
exempting transactions from the anti-trust laws are more difficult
to satisfy."
The principal new provisions on state regulation of air com-
merce are contained in Section 105." Section 105(a) generally
preempts state regulations of the "rates, routes, or services" of an
N.E.2d 327 (1974); Comment, 39 J. AIR L. & COM. 521 (1973); Note, 42 J. AIR
L. & CoM. 651 (1976).
4' Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby,
328 U.S. 256 (1946).
4411 U.S. 624, 635 n.14.
"See note 41 supra.
4 See note 48 infra. The term "economic regulation" will be used interchange-
ably with the term regulation of "rates, routes, and services."
4See Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-504, 92 Stat. 1705
(1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. 55 1301-1542).
47 See generally id. §§ 3(a), 7-16, 22, 26-28, and 37.
11Id. 5 4(a) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. 5 1305).
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air carrier having authority under Title IV of the Act to provide
interstate air transportation. 9 The legislative history of Section 105
makes it clear that Congress intended to end dual federal-state
economic regulation of interstate carriers." The House Report on
a previous bill, H.R. 12611,"' which contained preemption provi-
sions substantially equivalent to ADA Section 105, explains that
the effect of the provision was to "prevent conflicts and inconsistent
regulations ... ."" The Senate Report on S. 2493, " which differed
from the ADA only in very insignificant respects, specifically men-
tions various instances of state regulation of federal carriers' rates
and concludes, "[c]learly, a Federal grant of authority, whether
a certificate or exemption, to engage in interstate transportation
issued by the Federal Government should give the Federal Govern-
ment the sole responsibility for regulating that air carrier.""4
Plainly Congress did not want its decision to deregulate federal
carriers to be undermined by increased or continued state regula-
tions. As the House Committee on Public Works and Transporta-
'Id. § 105(a) provides:
(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2) of this subsection, no
State or political subdivision hereof and no interstate agency or
other political agency of two or more States shall enact or enforce
any law, rule, regulation, standard, or other provision having the
force and effect of law relating to rates, routes, or services of any
air carrier having authority under title IV of this Act to provide
interstate air transportation.
(2) Except with respect to air transportation (other than charter
air transportation) provided pursuant to a certificate issued by the
Board under Section 401 of this Act, the provisions of paragraph
(1) of this subsection shall not apply to any transportation by air
of persons, property or mail conducted wholly within the State of
Alaska.
Both the House and Senate Bills contained preemption provisions. The pri-
mary difference between the two provisions was then under the Senate version;
preemption would not take effect so long as a carrier derived more than 50 per-
cent of its revenues from intrastate operations. S. 2493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. §
17 (1978). The Conference Committee selected the House version [which pro-
vided for immediate preemption]. Earlier regulatory reform measures, such as
H.R. 8813 (Air Service Improvement Act of 1977), also contained preemption
provisions. See CONG. REC. H10,007-008 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977).
50H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 94-95 (Conference Report), re-
printed in [1978] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5523, 5554-55.
51H.R. 12611, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
52H.R. REP. No. 1211, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 16 (1978).
'IS. 2493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
54S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 98 (1978).
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tion pointed out when considering H.R. 8813," which had a similar
preemption provision:
with the passage of legislation . . . loosening Federal regulation
of airline service and fares, it is possible that some states will
enact their own regulatory legislation, imposing utility-type regula-
tion on interstate airline service and fares. The Act includes a
specific statutory provision precluding state interference with inter-
state service and fares.5"
Other provisions in the ADA include Section 105(c) which
guarantees that an intrastate carrier receiving interstate authority
will automatically be entitled to all of the authority it previously
held from the state."' Section 105(b) (1) preserves existing state
and local authority to exercise proprietary rights as the owner or
operator of an airport served by federal carriers."' Section 105(b)
(2) provides that an aircraft operating between two points in the
same state shall not be considered to be operating in interstate air
transportation solely by reason of crossing a state or federal
boundary." Another provision of the ADA affecting the federal-
"H.R. 8813, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977).
"See 123 CoNG. REC. H10,007-008 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977) (section by sec-
tion analysis of H.R. 8813, 95th Cong., 1st Sess.).
57S 105(c) provides:
When any intrastate air carrier which on August 1, 1977, was
operating primarily in intrastate air transportation regulated by a
State receives the authority to provide interstate air transportation,
any authority received from such State shall be considered to be part
of its authority to provide air transportation received from the
Board under title IV of this Act, until modified, suspended, amend-
ed, or terminated as provided under such title.
"Pub. L. No. 95-504 § 4(a) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C. S 1305) § 105(b)(1)
provides:
Nothing in subsection (a) of this section shall be construed to
limit the authority of any State or political subdivision thereof or
any interstate agency or other political agency of two or more
States as the owner or operator of an airport served by any air
carrier certificated by the Board to exercise its proprietary powers
and rights.
111d. S 105(b)(2) provides:
Any aircraft operated between points in the same State (other
than the State of Hawaii) which in the course of such operation
crosses a boundary between two States, or between the United
States and any other country, or between a State and the beginning
of the territorial waters of the United States, shall not, by reason
of crossing such boundary, be considered to be operating in inter-
state or overseas air transportation.
This provision, in effect, overrides the contrary language concerning aircraft op-
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state division of regulatory responsibility is Section 401 (d) (4).'
This section allows intrastate carriers to operate under interline
arrangements with federal carriers."1
mI. SPECIFIC AREAS OF POSSIBLE CONTROVERSY AS TO THE
EFFECT OF THE ADA ON STATE REGULATION
The Section 105 preemption provisions were effective imme-
diately upon adoption of the ADA." The CAB has issued interim
policy statements in which it purports to take exclusive jurisdiction
over all operations of certified carriers and air taxis which have
received federal authority." There are several areas of possible
conflict with states under the ADA and this policy which will be
addressed in this article: state route and rate regulation of certifi-
cated carriers; state regulation of air taxis; the definition of
"services"; and the status of the proprietary rights doctrine.
A. State Rate and Route Regulation of Certificated Carriers
Under the ADA, the clearest case of preempted state regulation
is state refusal to give a federally certificated carrier intrastate
route authority or state regulation of such a carrier's intrastate
rates.' Such a situation has arisen in California, where the CPUC
erations contained in the definition of interstate, overseas, and foreign air trans-
portation in 49 U.S.C. § 102(22)(a) (1976).
e0 401(d)(4) provides in part:
Notwithstanding any other provision of this Act, any citizen of
the United States who undertakes, within any State, the carriage
of persons or property as a common carrier for compensation or
hire with aircraft capable of carrying thirty or more persons pur-
suant to authority for such carriage within such State granted by
the appropriate State agency is authorized-
(i) to establish services for persons and property which in-
cludes transportation by such citizen over its routes in such State
and transportation by an air carrier or a foreign air carrier in
air transportation; and
(ii) subject to the requirements of section 412 of this title,
to enter into an agreement with any air carrier or foreign air
carrier for the establishment of joint fares, rates, or services for
such through services.
Pub. L. No. 95-504 S 9 (amending § 401(d)(4) of the Federal Aviation Act of
1958, 49 U.S.C. 5 1371(d)(4) (1976)).
61 Id.
1 Id. at § 4(a).
6344 Fed. Reg. 9948 (1979).
" See note 49 supra.
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operates under a state constitution which provides that a state
agency:
has no power to declare a statute unenforceable, or to refuse to
enforce a statute on the basis that federal law or federal regulations
prohibit enforcement of such statute unless an appellate court has
made a determination that the enforcement of such statute is pro-
hibited by federal law or federal regulations.'
Upon passage of the ADA, the CPUC sent all carriers which
were operating in that state a letter indicating that it was constitu-
tionally required to uphold the state statute and that, in its view,
all carriers were required to file tariffs and abide by state regula-
tions." The letter" may indicate that the CPUC's defense of its regu-
lation will be more than pro forma. Several certificated carriers,
the United States, and the CAB obtained an injunction in Federal
District Court to bar the CPUC from asserting jurisdiction in this
area."8 Other states which have abstained from what they believe
to be the full scope of their jurisdiction may reassert their regulatory
authority if the California case upholds the state's authority."'
California's regulatory scheme over intrastate rates is similar to
the CAB's. It includes advance filing of tariffs, suspension of po-
tentially unlawful tariffs pending a hearing, and ultimate authority
to prescribe the lawful rate after a final determination that the filed
rate is unlawful." It is difficult to conceive of a more vivid illus-
tration of the type of regulation that Congress sought to pre-
'5 CAL. CONST., art. 3, § 3.5.
" Letter from Frederick E. John, Executive Director of the California Public
Utilities Commission to John M. Harmon, President of Golden West Airlines,
Inc. (November 15, 1978).
Many carriers have filed tariffs for fear of state enforcement proceedings.
However, effective December 31, 1978, Hughes Airwest and other airlines filed
rates with the CAB governing their intrastate routes. They also filed "provisional"
tariffs with California which would lose effect upon the invalidation of the state
regulatory scheme.
671d.
"Hughes Air Corp. v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, No. 78-2880 (N.D. Cal.
March 9, 1979). The injunction was granted on a motion for summary judgment.
As of the time of this writing, however, the time for appeal has not passed. The
court did not issue a written opinion.
"9 An example is the application of Pennsylvania law in Allegheny Airlines,
Inc. v. Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 319 F. Supp. 407 (E.D. Pa. 1970), a/I'd, 465 F.2d
237 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 943 (1972).
7* See note 19 supra.
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empt. If the California scheme is upheld, then federal carriers may
remain subject to dual regulation on the same flight. The state
would regulate passengers whose origin and destination are within
the state, and the Board would regulate interstate passengers.
This is the precise example of regulation which was cited in the
House, Senate, and Conference Reports as the primary target of
the preemption provision." For example, the House Report on
H.R. 12611," which contained preemption provisions substantially
equivalent to the final ADA, concluded:
The lack of specific provisions [concerning preemption] has cre-
ated uncertainties and conflicts, including situations in which car-
riers have been required to charge different fares for passengers
traveling between two cities depending on whether these passengers
were interstate passengers whose fares were regulated by the CAB
or intrastate passengers, whose fares were regulated by a State.
H.R. 12611 will prevent conflicts and inconsistent regulations by
providing that when a carrier operates under authority granted pur-
suant to Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act, no State may regu-
late that carrier's rates, routes, or services."r
The wording of Section 105(a) could not be more explicit. It
provides that "no State shall regulate rates, routes, or services of
an air carrier having authority under Title IV to provide interstate
air transportation."
7 4
Since the statute clearly provides for preemption, it would appear
that the state's only remaining argument would be that Congress
lacks the constitutional authority to preempt intrastate regulation.
However, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held
Congress could, if it chose, extend federal economic regulatory
authority to local activities that are related to, and have an effect
on, interstate commerce." Even in the absence of explicit pre-
emption such as provided for in Section 105 of the Act, courts
have held that intrastate transportation is so closely related to
interstate commerce that various state economic regulations were
"See notes 51-54 supra and accompanying text.
71 See note 51 supra.
73 H.R. REP. No. 1211, supra note 52, at 15-16 (footnote omitted).
4 See note 49 supra.
73 Colorado v. United States, 271 U.S. 123, 162-63 (1926); Minnesota Rate
Cases, 230 U.S. 352, 398-99 (1915).
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incompatible with the federal regulatory schemes." Courts have
held that a congressional intent to leave a particular subject free
from government interference can preempt states just as clearly as
an affirmative federal regulation."
Congress has, however, very clearly expressed its intent to pre-
empt state economic regulation in areas it has deregulated at the
federal level. Congress was aware, with the passage of legislation
loosening federal regulation of airline service and fares, states
might impose public utility type regulation." It sought to preclude
this result by enacting Section 105."
The actual and anticipated attempts by states to fill the vacuum
left by federal deregulation invite a contest over the legality of
such action. The express language of the ADA indicates that
Congress envisioned open entry and pricing as a means of en-
couraging competition. Further, the legislative history of the ADA
is replete with evidence which establishes that Congress intended
that states be stripped of all regulatory power over the routes and
rates of federal carriers. Under the Commerce Clause ' and the
Supremacy Clause," Congress has authority to regulate interstate
commerce and to override any state law which interferes with that
authority. Congress has clearly exercised its prerogative to legis-
late a national policy on economic regulation of airlines and to
preempt state rate and route regulation. Such state regulation of
federally certificated air carriers is, therefore, invalid.
B. State Regulation of Air Taxis
As noted above, states are preempted from economic regulation
" Pioneer Airways, Inc. v. City of Kearney, 199 Neb. 12, 256 N.W.2d 324
(1977); Opinion of the Justices, __ Mass. _ 251 N.E.2d 254 (1971); Baltimore
Ship & Receiv. Ass'n, Inc. v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 286 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal.
1967).
" "For a state to impinge on an area of labor combat designed to be free is
quite as much an obstruction of federal policy as if the state were to declare
picketing free for purposes or by methods which the federal Act forbids." Garner
v. Teamsters Union, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953).
7
8 See 123 CONG. REc. H10,007-008 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1977) (remarks of
Rep. Anderson).
"Id.
"U.S. CONST. art. I, S 8; see Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, Pub. L. No.
95-504, § 33(a), 92 Stat. 1705 (amending Title IV of the Federal Aviation Act
of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (1976)).
81 See note 7 supra.
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of carriers having "authority under Title IV [of the Act] ... to pro-
vide interstate air transportation." There is a large group of
carriers known as air taxis which operate small aircraft (generally
less than fifty-six seats) and are exempt under Section 416 of the
Act and Part 298 of the CAB's Economic Regulations from the
certification and rate regulation requirements of the Act." Based
upon statutory construction, states may advance theories to justify
regulating some or all of the air taxis registered under Part 298
of the CAB's Economic Regulations.
A state asserting jurisdiction over all air taxis would have to
establish that a federal exemption under Section 416(b) (4) is not
"authority under Title IV [of the Act] ... to provide interstate air
transportation" within the meaning of Section 105(a)." Thus,
state regulation of air taxis would not be preempted by virtue of
Section 105(a). This argument, however, runs against both the
clear meaning of Section 105(a) and the legislative history.
An airline registered under the CAB's air taxi regulations is
authorized to serve all points in the United States so long as it
meets the requirements of Part 298.' As such, it would clearly
seem to have authority, by virtue of Section 416 of the Act, to
provide interstate air transportation."'
This interpretation is reinforced by the legislative history of the
ADA. An earlier version of the ADA, S. 2493,7 specifically trig-
" See note 49 supra.
8349 U.S.C. § 1386(b)(4) (1976); 14 C.F.R. §§ 298.11-.14 (1978).
COMMUTER EXEMPTION
(4) Subject to paragraph (5) of this subsection any air carrier
in air transportation which provides (A) passenger service solely
with aircraft having a maximum passenger capacity of less than
fifty-six passengers or (B) cargo service in air transportation solely
with aircraft having a maximum payload capacity of less than
eighteen thousand pounds, shall be exempt from the requirements
of subsection (a) of Section 401 of this title, and of such other sec-
tions of this Act as may be prescribed in regulations promulgated
by the Board, if such air carrier conforms to such liability insur-
ance requirements and such other reasonable regulations as the
Board shall from time to time adopt in the public interest. The
Board may by regulation increase the passenger or property capaci-'
ties specified in this paragraph when the public interest so requires.
49 U.S.C. S 1386(b)(4) (1976).
"See note 49 supra.
"See note 83 supra.
8"Id.
87 See note 54 supra.
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gered preemption for any carrier "certificated or exempted by the
Board" under Title IV." The Conference Committee's selection
of the even broader House language "authority under Title IV"
would seem to include at least the two forms of authority specifically
mentioned in S. 2493." In explaining the Senate provision, Senator
Cannon stated that if Part 298 taxis retained their exempt status,
federal law preempts state regulation over them."
The preemption of state regulation of air taxis is further rein-
forced by the fact that in Alaska, Congress specified that the state
was only prohibited from regulating federally certificated carriers."
In other states, therefore, it seems clear that exemption authority
under Title IV would be sufficient. If Congress had intended other-
wise, there would have been no need to create a specific exception
for Alaska.
Finally, an argument could be made that an exemption from
the federal certification requirement is not federal authority, but
is simply action removing the need for federal authority. This
argument runs counter to previous court interpretations of pre-
emption in aviation and other areas." A congressional grant of
authority to the CAB to exempt airlines from certain provisions
of the Act has been held to take on the character of a decision
that once a carrier is exempted, it should not be fully regulated. "
For example, in Pioneer Airways, Inc. v. City of Kearney," a Neb-
raska court relied upon this theory and overruled the state Public
Utilities Commission's order preventing an exempted air taxi from
dropping a route between two Nebraska points that were part of
a flight that included out-of-state points. Also, in the rates area,
18S. 2493, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. § 17 (1978); S. REP. No. 631, 95th Cong.,
ed Sess. 39 (1978).
"H.R. REP. No. 1779, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1978).
124 CONG. REC. S5873 (daily ed. April 19, 1978).
"Pub. L. No. 95-504 § 4(a), 92 Stat. 1707 (1978) (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1305).
11NLRB v. Nash-Finch Co., 404 U.S. 138, 144 (1971); Garner v. Teamsters
Union, 346 U.S. 485, 500 (1953); Bethlehem Steel Co. v. State Labor Relations
Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 773-74 (1947); Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line R.R., 272 U.S.
605, 613 (1926); Pioneer Airways, Inc. v. City of Kearney, 199 Neb. 12, 256
N.W.2d 324 (1977).
"Pioneer Airways, Inc. v. City of Kearney, 199 Neb. 12, 256 N.W.2d 324
(1977).
94 Id.
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a surface carrier's federal exemption preempts state rate regula-
tion."
Even if a state concedes that it cannot regulate all air taxis, it
may attempt to regulate air taxis which do not fly across state
lines. The justification for state regulation would be that such car-
riers are not in "interstate air transportation," and thus, are not
operating, within the meaning of Section 105 (a), under "authority
.. . to provide interstate air transportation."8 This approach is
unsound. An airline need not operate across state lines to be en-
gaged in interstate air transportation."" The determinative factors
are where the passenger's journey began and ended." Aircraft
whose origin and destination lie in a single state can be carrying
a significant number of connecting passengers who are on an inter-
state journey. The mere fact that an air taxi does not operate across
state lines does not, therefore, remove it from the realm of con-
gressional authority.
Where preemption is conceded as to those airlines carrying inter-
state traffic pursuant to their registration as federal air taxis, there
is a theoretical, although highly unlikely, possibility that a few of
the air taxis registered with the CAB carry no (or de minimis)
interstate traffic, and the issue arises as to whether states can regu-
late those airlines."
The language of Section 105, "air carriers having authority un-
der Title IV . . . ," suggests that it is sufficient to have federal
authority to provide interstate operations regardless of whether
the airline's operations actually require federal authority-i.e., to
conduct those operations without federal authority would violate
the Act. As discussed above, the legislative history of Section 105
shows that Congress clearly intended to preempt state regulation
of air taxis, and it gave no indication that any subgroup of taxis
IBaltimore Ship. & Receiv. Ass'n v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 268 F. Supp.
836 (N.D. Cal. 1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 583 (1968).
"See Pub. L. No. 95-504 S 4(a), 92 Stat. 1707 (1978) (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1305).
" California v. CAB, 581 F.2d 954, 956 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, -
U.S. - 99 S.Ct. 834 (1979); CAB v. Friedkin Aeronautics, 246 F.2d 173 (9th
Cir. 1957). See also United States v. Capital Transit Co., 325 U.S. 357 (1945).
8 Id.
"There is, of course, no bar to state regulation of an airline that has no au-
thority to and does not in fact carry interstate traffic.
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(i.e., those that do not, in fact, carry interstate traffic) was to be
excluded.1" Thus, in explaining S. 2493,1 which was in all relevant
respects identical to Section 105, Senator Cannon indicated that,
if a Part 2981' carrier retains the exempt status which it had prior
to the ADA, federal law preempts state regulation over it."
Moreover, as noted above, there are exceptions to both the pre-
emption provision and the statutory commuter exemption for air
taxis in Alaska.1 ' Those exceptions reinforce the conclusion that
other states are preempted from regulating all air taxis. This is
because the exceptions would be unnecessary if states could regu-
late air taxis.
It is possible, however, to construct an argument that the ADA
does not preempt state regulation of air taxis that carry no inter-
state traffic. Section 105 of the Act applies only to "air carriers..1..
In the past this term has meant a carrier engaged in interstate
traffic."° Moreover, the CAB has declined to exercise jurisdiction
over carriers with less than an unspecified "de minimis" percentage
of interstate traffic. ' Further, there is some legislative history to
the effect that Congress did not intend to diminish state authority
over truly intrastate carriers.1 " However, the CAB's de minimis rule
is vague and is not statutorily required.' Thus, it is difficult to
argue that Congress implicitly sanctioned that rule by enacting
Section 105.
Two other provisions of the ADA may bear on this issue. Sec-
tion 416(b) (4) provides a statutory exemption from the certifi-
cate requirement for carriers operating aircraft with a maximum
capacity of less than fifty-six passengers, provided that the carrier
complies with CAB regulations regarding insurance and other re-
10 See notes 88-90 supra and accompanying text.
101 See note 54 supra.
10 14 C.F.R. S 298 (1978).
103 124 CONG. REC. S5,873 (daily ed. April 19, 1978).
0
' See notes 49 & 83 supra.
"See note 49 supra.
11 Lake Tahoe Service Investigation, CAB Order No. 78-5-77 (May 12, 1978).
107 Id.
108 Senator Cannon, in a colloquy with Senator Bentsen, states: "This bill does
nothing to change the States' jurisdiction over the operations of those intrastate
carriers which continue to provide solely intrastate services." 124 CONG. REC.
S18,799 (daily ed. Oct. 14, 1978) (remarks of Senator Cannon).
108 Lake Tahoe Service Investigation, CAB Order No. 78-5-77 (May 12, 1978).
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quirements.' ° For the reasons set out above, an exemption granted
pursuant to Section 416, whether directly by the statute or in-
directly by CAB regulations, is "authority under Title IV [of the
Act] ... to provide interstate air transportation."'' . Therefore, Sec-
tion 416(b) (4) does not alter the above analysis of the question of
preemption of state regulation of air taxis.
Finally, Section 401 (d) (4) permits intrastate carriers with more
than thirty-seat aircraft to interline with federal carriers without
complying with other provisions of the Act, including those which
would otherwise require a federal certificate to carry interstate
traffic. " ' This provision makes sense only if it is read to apply to
airlines that lack federal authority from other sources such as
Section 416 (b) or Part 298. Thus, an intrastate carrier that chooses
not to obtain any type of federal authority may interline with the
federal system and not violate the Act. The provision would seem
to have no applicability to a carrier that holds federal authority to
carry interstate traffic (via interlining or otherwise) under Part
298 or Section 416(b)."u
As a practical matter, it makes little difference whether Section
105 is limited to CAB authorized air taxis which actually carry
interstate traffic. It is difficult to conceive of an air taxi that affirma-
tively restricts its passengers to travelers on intrastate journeys, so
all air taxis will in fact carry a measurable amount of interstate
traffic. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that preemption
extends to all air taxis registered with the CAB.
In evaluating the issues discussed above regarding state regula-
tion of air taxis, there is an important federal interest at stake:
throughout the ADA, Congress has relied heavily on competition
by air taxis, unrestricted by government regulation, to provide in-
centives for industry efficiency. For example, air taxis are allowed
to apply for authority that is currently held by other carriers, but
not used. 1 Air taxis are eligible to bid for subsidies to provide essen-
110 See note 83 supra.
"'1 Pub. L. No. 95-504, S 4(a), 92 Stat. 1707 (1978) (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1305).
11"Pub. L. No. 95-504, 5 9, 92 Stat. 1713 (1978) (to be codified in 49 U.S.C.
S 1371).
" See note 83 supra.
14 Pub. L. No. 95-504, 5 10, 92 Stat. 1713 (1978) (amending § 401(d) of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. 5 1371 (1976)).
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tial air service to small communities that is scheduled to be dropped
by the incumbent certificate holder."' And, air taxis are guaranteed
an exemption from the Act's licensing requirement."' To permit
states to restrict the rate structure and pricing policies of authorized
air taxis would seriously undermine these important federal
policies."'
C. Definition of Services
Thus far, the discussion has revolved around the issue of which
carriers fall within the scope of the Section 105(a) preemption.
Remaining issues revolve around the scope of federal and state
regulatory responsibility over carriers that are within the scope of
that provision. States are preempted from regulating those carriers'
"routes, rates, or services.11.. The explicit preemption of state regu-
lation of rates and routes is fairly straightforward. The term "serv-
ices," on the other hand, is susceptible to interpretation. Clearly,
it includes such state regulations as those discussed above in the
pre-ADA cases: an outright ban on all supersonic aircraft;.. regula-
tions protecting intrastate carriers from interstate competitors;...
and regulation of the manner and pattern of service provided to
points designated in the federal certificate. '
The CAB has in the past taken an expansive interpretation of
its jurisdiction over carriers' services. Under such interpretation
the CAB has regulated diverse aspects of air transportation such
as liquidated damages for overbooking, segregation of smoking
and nonsmoking passengers,' notice of the minimum liability for
1" Pub. L. No. 95-504, § 33, 92 Stat. 1732-40 (1978) (amending Title IV of
the Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. § 1389 (1976)).
1 See note 83 supra.
11 See note 90 supra.
"I Pub. L. No. 95-504, 5 4(a), 92 Stat. 1707 (1978) (to be codified in 49
U.S.C. § 1305).
' Opinion of the Justices, __ Mass. -, 271 N.E.2d 354 (1971).
"I Braniff Int'l, Inc. v. Fla. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 576 F.2d 1100 (5th Cir.
1978).
121 Pioneer Airways, Inc. v. City of Kearney, 199 Neb. 12, 256 N.W.2d 324
(1977).
112 14 C.F.R. 55 250.1-.10 (1978).
11214 C.F.R. 55 252.1-.5 (1978).
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loss, damaged and delayed baggage," charges for headsets, " ' alco-
holic beverages,26 excess baggage, " and entertainment," ground
packages tied to charter transportation, 2' and space allocable to
various classes of service for ratemaking purposes."0 A recent deci-
sion from another area of transportation by the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, D. C. Transit Sys-
tems, Inc. v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Commission,"'
supports an expansive reading of service regulation.
Based on the CAB's traditionally expansive definition of services,
and D.C. Transit Systems, Inc., the CAB has maintained its broad
reading of the term "services.. '1". Preemption is considered, by the
CAB, to extend to all of the economic factors that go into the
provision of air service and make up the quid pro quo for the
passenger's fare.' Under this interpretation, states would be pre-
empted from regulating any of the aspects of service received by
passengers including flight frequency, minimum liability insur-
ance, smoking, meals, and other aspects of flight services. Other
state attempts to affect the quality of carrier service through bond-
ing or minimum capitalization requirements would also be pre-
empted.""
Certain types of state regulation may continue to be valid in
the absence of a finding that their enforcement is contrary to fed-
eral policies. For example, tariff filing with advance notice pro-
visions consistent with the federal notice provisions might be
"414 C.F.R. § 221.176 (1978).
'3' Price v. Trans World Airlines, 481 F.2d 844 (9th Cir. 1973); see generally
14 C.F.R. § 221.3 (1978).
126 33 Fed. Reg. 4456 (1968).
"27 Baggage Allowance Tariff Rules in Overseas & Foreign Air Transportation,
CAB Order No. 76-3-81 (March 12, 1976).
121 Price v. Trans World Airlines, 481 F.2d 844, 847 (9th Cir. 1973).
12See 14 C.F.R. § 378 (1978).
"4 Continental Air Lines v. CAB, 551 F.2d 1293 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (citing
Domestic Passenger Fare Investigation Phase 9, CAB Order No. 74-3-82 (March
18, 1974)).
131466 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
a See note 63 supra.
13" Id.
"4 Id. This would be under the type of analysis in D.C. Transit Systems, Inc.
v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Comm'n, 466 F.2d 394 (D.C. Cir. 1972),
which recognizes that capitalization is an aspect of rate regulation.
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valid for informational, not regulatory, purposes." This may not
be true, however, if the CAB limits or abolishes advance filing.
Assuming such a change was an effort to prevent competitors from
engaging in parallel pricing behavior, state regulation may frus-
trate federal policy, and thus, would be preempted.
State regulation of false or misleading practices also may sur-
vive preemption. The CAB has extensive regulations on over-
booking. ' In Nader v. Allegheny Airlines,"' however, the Supreme
Court of the United States specifically upheld an action at common
law for misrepresentation as a result of overbooking. The Nader
case concluded that there was no irreconcilable conflict between
the Act's scheme and the state common law remedy.138 The case
may not, however, stand for the proposition that a state may
generally regulate false or misleading carrier practices. The reason
for this is the CAB's overbooking rules specifically permit the pas-
senger to waive the liquidated damages which have been set by
the CAB and pursue common law rights."' If the CAB chose to
eliminate that option it is not clear whether the common law right
would survive.'
In sum, even with the explicit statutory provision on preemption
there may be gray areas in deciding the permissible scope of state
regulation of federally authorized carriers. In those cases, courts
will resort to the type of interest analysis used where there is no
explicit provision on preemption."' In those cases, the court will
also balance the federal interest in freeing airlines carrying inter-
state traffic from economic regulation so as to encourage competi-
tion against the state interest" in regulating aviation in order to
protect the public health, safety, and welfare. Obviously, the state's
5 See generally Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Department of Pub. Util., 304
U.S. 61 (1938).
If' See note 121 supra.
"37426 U.S. 290 (1976).
"1 Id.
'See 14 C.F.R. § 250.7 (1978).
'
4 0 For example, if the Board concluded that disclosure of overbooking was
not required and would exacerbate the problem of multiple reservations, then en-
forcement of the common-law right might conflict with federal policy.
'l Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151 (1978).
'24 Id.
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interest in public health, safety, and welfare will be given greater
weight than its interest in purely economic regulation. "
D. Proprietary Rights
The one area that is clearly preserved for the state is its "pro-
prietary right" as an airport owner or operator.'" The section-by-
section analysis of a substantially identical earlier version of the
House Bill, H.R. 8813,1" which had an identical provision, states:
'This is not intended to preempt the exercise of normal proprietary
functions by airport operators, such as the establishing of curfews
and landing fees which are consistent with other requirements in
Federal law and do not unduly burden interstate commerce.'"
This language is consistent with pre-ADA cases upholding local
airport authorities' rights to impose landing fees,"" noise regula-
tions,"'4 and curfews.'" However, those local rights are limited
by prior case law in several important respects. First, the local
action must truly be that of the airport proprietor and not that of
the state acting under its police power."' Second, the regulation
cannot interfere with the FAA's flight patterns'.1 ' Finally, the regu-
lation must be reasonable, nondiscriminatory, nonburdensome to
interstate commerce, and the local process for resolving issues
arising under its proprietory regulations cannot be unreasonably
slow. 152
1" Compare Ray v. Atlantic Richfield, 435 U.S. 151 (1978) with Baltimore
Ship. & Receiv. Ass'n v. Cal. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 268 F. Supp. 836 (N.D. Cal.
1967), aff'd, 389 U.S. 583 (1968).
'" See note 58 supra.
" See note 55 supra.
14 123 CONG. REC. H10,087-88 (daily ed. Sept. 23, 1975).
14" Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Auth. of New York, 305 F. Supp.
93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969).
"I Air Transp. Ass'n v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
14 National Aviation v. City of Hayward, 418 F. Supp. 417 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
1"0City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973);
San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283 (S.D. Cal. 1978).
151 American Airlines v. Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
393 U.S. 1017 (1969); Allegheny Airlines v. Village of Cedarhurst, 238 F.2d 812
(2d Cir. 1956).
"I See British Airways Bd. v. Port Auth. of New York, 558 F.2d 75 (2d Cir.),
on remand, 437 F. Supp. 809 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd & modified, 564 F.2d 1002 (2d
Cir. 1977).
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Airport curfews are currently in effect in various cities."' In
some instances, the FAA has refused to permit a specific curfew on
the grounds that it would disrupt federal flight plans and be a safety
hazard."' There are now specific procedures for evaluating such
measures as curfews with Environmental Protection Agency
input.1
Where a state is preempted from a specific type of regulation,
it cannot attempt to accomplish indirectly what it is forbidden from
doing directly."' This principle, coupled with the general require-
ment of reasonable and nondiscriminatory treatment of airport
users"" and the general policy of liberal entry in the ADA,' would
create a very strong barrier against efforts to use environmental
regulation to exclude new entrants. This is particularly true where
incumbent airlines are allowed to expand their aircraft operations
(and therefore their noise and pollution) without suffering the re-
strictions placed on new entrants.
In sum, the Airline Deregulation Act phases out economic regu-
lation of airlines having federal authority at both the federal and
state level. The CAB has interpreted the ADA to preempt all state
regulation of traffic on airlines with federal certificates, or with
an exemption from federal certification. Thus, during the transition
to complete deregulation the CAB will generally treat former intra-
state carriers the same as existing interstate carriers for most
regulatory purposes. It is the author's opinion that the CAB's in-
terpretation of the preemption provision correctly recognizes the
congressional intent to deregulate airlines at both the federal and
state level. While this approach may end virtually all state eco-
nomic regulation of airlines, that result is consistent with the policy
behind the ADA-that unregulated airlines will operate more
efficiently than regulated airlines."'
City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624 (1973).
'"411 U.S. at 639.
155 Id.
1"' San Diego Unified Port Dist. v. Gianturco, 457 F. Supp. 283, 293 (S.D.
Cal. 1978).
"'See note 44 supra and accompanying text.
'"See note 47 supra and accompanying text.
159 See note 1 supra.
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